
The following is an article regarding the facts of the Ford transponder system being defeated. The article is written by Thomas G.
Seroogy,CFL. The article is endorsed by Ken Vitty of Sterling Investigative Services and Rich Pacheco of
N.E.T.S
Ford Busted or not?
By Thomas G Seroogy, CFL
Introduction
Broadcasting the potential theft of millions of Ford vehicles; this
weekends media reporting of recent transponder research at John Hopkins is
creating unwarranted concerns of uncontrolled theft and fraud.
At the heart of the issue is the recent cracking by researchers of the
algorithm used in the encryption protection of the Texas Instrument chip used
in a single type Ford key.
In typical media fashion, the degree of theft risk this
"breakthrough research" presents exaggerated and overstated.
Here are the facts:
1. Based on the information provided by the media, relative
to automotive applications, the "crack" affected a single chip
currently used only on the Ford Focus and Escape, and the Ford produced Mazda
Tribute.
2. This breakthrough simply means that keys that
could not previously be cloned are now cloneable, and then, only under
laboratory conditions.
3. This breakthrough affects the key only, and does not
affect the ability to bypass or defeat the immobilizer system installed in the
vehicle when working and programmed key is not available.
4. The research was performed by researchers whose leader
is heavily involved and knowledgeable of encryption technology; despite their
credentials, it still took this group and a handful of computers three months
of full time work to crack the chip; the research was heavily financed.
Discussion
The recent code breaking of the Texas Instrument based Ford transponder
key is neither new nor unexpected. Private companies with interest in the
production and duplication of the transponder based keys and cloning equipment
have always recognized that the protection schemes on encrypted transponder
keys are breakable. In fact, due more to legislative restrictions
pursuant to use of encrypted data than by technical limitations, the chip(s)
used in these transponder keys use 40-bit instead of the more 128-bit
encryption. As the "breaking" process is nothing more than a
trial run of every single possible code, the 40-bit encryption scheme is
obviously less secure.
From a commercial standpoint, the sole reason for not pursuing this
technology is simple economics - the time and resources required to break the
codes of the various transponder keys is not only costly, but copyright,
patent and other protections create immense and costly legal hurdles. As
such, the investment needed to create commercially available products cannot
be justified.
Needless to say, breaking the code is a concept not new to entities
having roots in auto theft. Well financed criminal organizations having
access to the technology and with the money and resources to invest are well
aware of any inherent weaknesses in not only the key, but the overall security
of any specific vehicle security system.
So, what does this supposed breakthrough mean to the face of auto
security? In the opinion of this expert - not much if anything.
Simply put, once all the hype is boiled out of this issue, it means
that the keys using this particular Texas Instrument chip can be cloned,
That's all.
And as a cloneable key, using this technology to steal a car still
requires access to cloning equipment and keys capable of working with the
encrypted chip, plus an already programmed and working key. In typical
media fashion, however, the ability to use this technology for theft is
overstated.
In reviewing the information on this breakthrough it should be
remembered that John Hopkins research performed the break and cloning under
ideal conditions. the subject chips or keys were exposed and stable, not
the conditions of an actual attempted theft.
In reality, the limitations of cloning severely limited its
effectiveness as a method of theft;
1. The extremely short transmission range of the chip
(4to20mm) make "code grabbing" extremely difficult without having
the key in hand. coming into close enough proximity of a transponder
chip for the time needed to grab the code is highly unlikely. Plus,
barriers such as the material of a pocket or purse, other metallic objects
like keys, and even ones hand can limit the ability to grab a code.
2. Compounding the difficulty is the fact that many chips,
direction also affects the ability to properly grab or steal a transponder
code. When a standard GM PK3 transponder key (a cloneable key) is placed
into a common and well known transponder reader, the unit correctly detects a
Megamos chip. if inserted upside down, however, it detects a Phillips
brand chip. when an otherwise uncloneable encrypted Cadillac Catera key
is placed upside down in a commercial cloning device, the key can be read,
copied and a cloned key can be created. Ford's newest key, using a Texas
Instrument encrypted "wedge" chip, only operates when properly
positioned in the ignition lock's keyway.
3. as more then 70 percent of todays vehicles come equipped
with transponder based immobilizers, the likelihood of an individual having
more then one transponder key on his/her person is extremely high. if
more than one transponder is on the key chain or within close proximity to one
another, grabbing or stealing causes both keys to simultaneously transmit
there code, disrupting or corrupting the code received by a code grabbing
device.
4. Once a key is cloned, the vehicle must be
located. this can only occur in targeted thefts; which involve not only
access to a working programmed key, but also enough surveillance to determine
the vehicles owners address or location of the vehicle.
5. Finally, from a commercial perspective, due to the
legal and economic barriers mentioned earlier, the production of and
accessibility to commercially available equipment and keys capable of working
with the encrypted chips is not likely to occur anytime soon; severely
limiting the potential for using this technology for
theft.
Conclusions:
it seems the media has struck a chord of the alarmist public. The
research considered a breakthrough is simple a working demonstration on the
limits of some levels of encryption technology. But, the technology used
to break the encryption on the Ford key is not new and not, generally
speaking, complicated, however it does demand time and money.
While 128-bit is preferred, the global market under which this
technology is used imposes legal limits that restrict manufacturers to the
less secure but still extremely effective 40-bit encryption.
Aside form the time and development costs, using this technology to
actually steal a vehicle requires the time and expense involved in targeting
and surveillance. in fact, the only credible scenario for a theft of this type
involves car owners having their key cloned at a car dealership, hardware
store, and/or locksmith; where both a working key and a vehicle location or
owner address are surrendered. Still as stated earlier, the
necessary equipment is not currently commercially available and probably wont
be for some time.
Another scenario with opportunity for theft using this method is
through locations offering valet services. instances of theft involving
valet services , however, while not unheard of, requires a coordinate effort
by a gang or organization that is well structured, understands the technology
and its application, and is capable of a higher degree of planning. This
technique eventually fails, however, because it requires direct contact with
the vehicle owner, and, through repeated theft becomes traceable.
For a car thief to use cloning as the method of theft, it is necessary
to have direct access to a working and programmed key, the technology
and tools to clone the key, time to clone the key, and foreknowledge of the
vehicles location. In all likelihood these opportunities may only
present themselves through direct contact with the owner.
Needless to say, considering the personal exposure and the degree of
planning required for this theft technique, the cloning
"breakthrough" of the John Hopkins research team really isn't the
crime industry's auto theft method of choice.
As regards fraud, insurance companies are bound to see a surge in
stolen vehicle claims that involve the use of a cloned key. Remember
that as presented by the media, the automotive transponder chip in question
affects the Ford Focus and Escape, and the ford produced Mazda Tribute
only. And, while the same code breaking process can be applied to most
all other auto manufacturers keys that employ the challenge response encrypted
technologies, is still involves an investment in time and money.
Finally, we need to ask does the John Hopkins demonstration reduce the
security of the Ford (or any) encrypted transponder technology and increase
the likelihood of theft? that depends on perspective.
Relative to "security by obscurity" the research has now made
public what has been known only for privately years, in this vein security of
these transponder systems have been reduced.
Relative to an increase in actual and legitimate thefts? Not likely -
this method requires targeting and surveillance to be affective, and there are
too many cost and time effective alternatives to this method, still, time will
tell.
Relative to detecting give ups? Highly unlikely - the equipment
to clone encrypted keys is not commercially available and development is
beyond the means of most individuals, small gangs and small
companies.
As a final note what does history teach us about the use of cloning to
steal a car? from the first transponder based vehicles that rolled off
there lines. General Motors and Honda vehicles as well as several other
manufacturers, have been vulnerable to cloning. To date cloning has not
been noted as a major method as theft for these vehicles or any other
transponder based vehicles. In other words we just don't see it
happening.
What does this breakthrough mean to the insurance company SIU and law
enforcement? The cloning method is still a legitimate technique of
stealing a vehicles. However, its use will probably be confined to
specific geographic locations.
As such it is important that officers and SIU personal obtain detailed
information on the history of the vehicle: ie, location of theft, names of
shops performing recent repairs, location were valet service was used,
etc. in other words was the insured and vehicle ever exposed to a
circumstance where a second party had unsupervised to the key and the home or
work address of the insured.
All in all, the media hype behind the research is intriguing, but void
of real world application.